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Abstract 
 
Surveys of corporate risk management document that selective hedging, where managers incorporate their 
market views into firms’ hedging programs, is widespread in the U.S. and other countries. Stulz (1996) 
argues that selective hedging could enhance the value of firms that possess an information advantage 
relative to the market and have the financial strength to withstand the additional risk from market timing. 
We study the practice of selective hedging in a 10-year sample of North American gold mining firms and 
find that selective hedging is most prevalent among firms that are least likely to meet these value- 
maximizing criteria -- (a) smaller firms, i.e., firms that are least likely to have private information about 
future gold prices; and (b) firms that are closest to financial distress. The latter finding provides support 
for the alternative possibility suggested by Stulz that selective hedging may also be driven by asset 
substitution motives. We detect weak relationships between selective hedging and some corporate 
governance measures, especially board size, but find no evidence of a link between selective hedging and 
managerial compensation. 
 
JEL Classification: G11; G14; G32; G39 
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I. Introduction 
Surveys of corporate hedging programs provide extensive evidence that firms routinely 
speculate within the context of their hedging programs by varying the size and the timing of their 
derivatives transactions based on managers’ market views, a practice known as “selective 
hedging.” For example, Dolde (1993), Bodnar, Hayt and Marston (1998), and Glaum (2002) 
report that the majority of firms in their respective surveys at least sometimes base the size of 
their hedges on their views of future market movements. Faulkender (2005), Adam and Fernando 
(2006), Brown, Crabb and Haushalter (2006), Beber and Fabbri (2006), and Géczy, Minton and 
Schrand (2007) also provide empirical evidence that is consistent with selective hedging. 
Stulz (1996) proposes a modified theory of corporate risk management that sets out the 
two economic criteria that need to be satisfied for firms to create value for their shareholders by 
engaging in selective hedging. First, firms need to possess an information advantage relative to 
the market to add value through market timing. Second, firms need sufficient financial strength 
to take additional speculative risks based on this information advantage without jeopardizing 
their core business. To our knowledge, there has been no attempt in the literature to relate the 
practice of selective hedging to these criteria for value enhancement. Moreover, there has been 
no investigation of the alternative possibility suggested by Stulz (1996) that even in the absence 
of private information, financially distressed firms can be motivated by an asset substitution 
incentive to engage in selective hedging.  
We examine these questions by studying the derivatives usage strategies of a sample of 
92 North American gold mining firms between 1989 and 1999.1 The gold mining industry is an 
ideal laboratory for a study of selective hedging because reasonable measures of the extent of 
                                                 
1 The data was collected by Ted Reeve of Scotia Capital by means of a quarterly survey. Unfortunately, this survey 
was discontinued in 1999, which limits our study to the 10-year period starting 1989. 
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selective hedging can be calculated due to the high data quality,2 and selective hedging appears 
to be widespread in this industry.3 Additionally, it is plausible that at least some firms in this 
industry possess an information advantage with respect to the future gold supply and hence, the 
gold price.4 Firms with a larger business presence in a particular market are more likely to 
acquire valuable information about this market. Stulz (1996) cites the hypothetical example of a 
producer of consumer durables using copper as a major input. Such a firm would have a 
significant incentive to gather information about the demand and supply of copper. Similarly, a 
large gold producing company with operations across countries or even continents has an 
incentive and ability to acquire information about the determinants of future gold prices. Such 
information could certainly affect a firm’s risk management strategy. 
We measure selective hedging in our sample by the deviations of actual derivatives 
positions from predicted derivatives positions assuming a pure hedging rationale. We find that 
the extent of selective hedging is positively correlated with a firm’s future stock return volatility, 
which suggests that selective hedging increases risk as surmised by Stulz (1996). We find a 
negative relation between selective hedging and firm size, implying that smaller firms speculate 
more than larger firms. This result stands in stark contrast to our findings for firms in the same 
sample (and by other researchers in several prior studies) that larger firms are more likely than 
smaller firms to use derivatives and hedge a higher fraction of their exposure. We find similar 
negative relations between selective hedging and two other measures of a firm’s footprint in the 
gold market – its annual gold production and its total gold reserves. In the gold mining industry, 
firm size, gold production, and gold reserves are all likely to be positively correlated with an 
                                                 
2 To our knowledge the gold mining industry is the only industry where the available data is sufficiently detailed to 
enable a systematic study of corporate speculation with derivatives. 
3 See Adam and Fernando (2006), and Brown, Crabb and Haushalter (2006). 
4 See, for example, Brown, Crabb and Haushalter (2006). 
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information advantage with respect to the aggregate gold production and hence the future gold 
price. Thus, it is those firms that should be least likely to have an information advantage that 
speculate the most. 
In addition, we find a negative relation between selective hedging and the probability of 
financial distress, as measured by either Altman’s (1968) Z-score or Ohlson’s (1980) O-score. 
Firms with the highest probabilities of bankruptcy tend to speculate the most, which is consistent 
with Stulz (1996)’s prediction for uninformed firms. These results are the opposite of what one 
would expect if selective hedging were adding to firm value. Instead, they are consistent with the 
classical asset-substitution problem first articulated by Jensen and Meckling (1976) and applied 
to the context of selective hedging by Stulz (1996) and Campbell and Kracaw (1999) as a 
rationale for more financially constrained firms to engage in activities that increase their risk 
exposure. 
Our findings that it is the smallest firms and those that are closest to financial distress in 
our sample that speculate the most should be disconcerting to shareholders and regulators, 
especially in the absence of evidence that selective hedging creates shareholder value.5 These 
findings naturally raise the question of how selective hedging is related to corporate governance. 
While our overall evidence on this question is weak, the strongest evidence we uncover is a 
positive relation between the extent of selective hedging and board size. This finding is 
consistent with the argument (see, for example, Yermack (1996)) that larger boards are less 
effective than smaller boards. Another related possibility is that the board puts compensation 
structures in place that perhaps inadvertently encourage some managers to speculate. For 
example, Géczy, Minton and Schrand (2007) find that the sensitivity of CFO compensation to 
stock returns (delta) is positively associated with the probability of actively taking positions 
                                                 
5 See Adam and Fernando (2006), and Brown, Crabb and Haushalter (2006). 
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(although they find a negative relation for CEOs), In contrast, we find no evidence to suggest 
that selective hedging in our sample of firms is motivated by managerial compensation 
structures. This leaves open the question of why managers at smaller firms engage more in 
selective hedging than managers at larger firms. Graham and Harvey (2001) note that managers 
at smaller firms tend to be financially less sophisticated than managers at larger firms. Thus, 
managers at smaller firms may be more likely to erroneously believe that they have an 
information advantage when, in fact, they do not.  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section II we review briefly the literature 
on selective hedging and formulate our empirical hypotheses. Section III describes the data and 
our methodology. Sections IV and V discuss our analysis and present our findings. Section VI 
concludes. 
 
II. Empirical Hypotheses 
The traditional theory of corporate risk management assumes that firms use derivatives 
purely for hedging purposes, i.e., without any speculative motives, and that the benefits of 
hedging accrue solely from the alleviation of market imperfections.6 However, there is 
considerable survey evidence that managers also speculate with derivatives, i.e., incorporate their 
market views into their hedging programs. In a survey of 244 Fortune 500 firms, Dolde (1993) 
reports that almost 90% of firms at least sometimes base the size of their hedges on their views 
of future market movements. Bodnar, Hayt and Marston (1998) survey derivatives policies by 
399 U.S. non-financial firms and find that about 50% of their sample firms admit to sometimes 
(and 10% frequently) altering the size and/or the timing of a hedge based on their market views. 
                                                 
6 See, for example, Stulz (1984), Smith and Stulz (1985), Stulz (1990), Froot, Scharfstein and Stein (1993), 
DeMarzo and Duffie (1995), and Mello and Parsons (2000). 
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Glaum (2002) surveys the risk management practices of the major non-financial firms in 
Germany. He finds that the majority follows forecast-based, profit-oriented risk management 
strategies.  Faulkender (2005) examines whether firms are hedging or timing the market when 
selecting the interest rate exposures of their new debt issuances. He finds that the interest rate 
exposure chosen is a function of the slope of the yield curve. Chernenko and Faulkender (2011) 
document that the use of interest rate swaps to speculate by firms in their sample is linked to 
executive compensation contracts that are more performance sensitive. Adam and Fernando 
(2006) find considerable evidence of selective hedging in their sample of gold mining firms but 
find no economically significant cash flow gains on average from selective hedging. Brown, 
Crabb, and Haushalter (2006) also study selective hedging in the gold mining industry and arrive 
at a similar conclusion. Beber and Fabbri (2006) analyze the time-series variation of foreign 
currency derivatives in a sample of large U.S. non-financial firms and document a substantial 
time-series variation in currency derivatives holdings in excess of what can be explained by 
changes in currency exposure, which they attribute to selective hedging.  
Collectively, these studies show that the practice of selective hedging is common in the 
corporate world. It is unclear, however, whether this practice is consistent with firm value 
maximization. According to Stulz (1996), a necessary condition for selective hedging to be value 
increasing is that the firm possesses valuable private information. He cites as an example a large 
copper consuming firm that obtains private information about the copper market as a result of its 
copper purchasing activities. Another example is a large gas pipeline and distribution company, 
which can acquire valuable information about gas demand and supply through the operation of 
its distribution network. The extent of private information a firm acquires is, of course, 
unobservable. However, it is plausible that larger firms have a greater potential to acquire 
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valuable information than smaller firms. The gold mining industry is no exception. The largest 
North American companies produce the most gold and operate globally, and therefore should 
have the highest potential for obtaining valuable information with respect to the future gold 
production and hence, the gold price. Therefore, all else equal, we expect larger firms to 
speculate more than smaller firms. 
However, selective hedging exposes a firm to new risks because the firm’s private 
information may be noisy or turn out to be incorrect. Stulz (1996) therefore predicts that only 
firms with sufficient financial strength will engage in selective hedging to benefit from a 
perceived information advantage. Financially less stable firms should refrain from incorporating 
their market views in order not to jeopardize their core businesses. This argument suggests that 
financially stronger firms will speculate more than financially weaker firms. 
In contrast, Stulz (1996) further notes that wealth transfer motives, as in Jensen and 
Meckling (1976) and Myers (1977), would provide managers of financially distressed firms with 
an incentive to speculate regardless of whether or not they have an information advantage. In a 
similar vein, Campbell and Kracaw (1999) argue that financially constrained firms have an 
incentive to increase risk exposure to potentially supplement their internal cash reserves and 
thereby overcome their financial constraints. In contrast to the previously discussed prediction, 
these arguments imply that financially constrained or distressed firms speculate more than 
financially secure firms. 
If selective hedging is motivated by asset substitution considerations, this would naturally 
raise the question of how selective hedging is related to corporate governance. For example, is 
corporate speculation positively related to less monitoring by the board? While value-
maximizing corporate governance structures can vary across firms as pointed out by Coles, 
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Lemmon and Wang (2009), identifying any systematic relationships that may exist between 
speculation and governance will be informative. 
Compensation structures may also affect a manager’s willingness to take speculative 
gambles. Tufano (1996) shows that stock options reduce the likelihood that managers will hedge 
a firm’s risk exposure. By induction and as argued by Géczy, Minton and Schrand (2007) and 
Beber and Fabbri (2006), stock options may cause some managers to become more risk tolerant 
and engage in explicit market timing activities that further increase stock price volatility, 
especially those with large stock option portfolios.7 Therefore, we expect to find a positive 
relationship between speculation and the sensitivity of executives’ compensation packages to 
their firm’s stock price volatility. 
 
III. Data and Methodology 
We study the derivatives transactions of a sample of 92 North American gold mining 
firms. The derivatives data is from the Gold and Silver Hedge Outlook , a quarterly survey 
conducted by Ted Reeve, an analyst at Scotia McLeod, from 1989 to 1999. Unfortunately, this 
survey was discontinued in 1999, which limits our study to the 1989-1999 period.8 The firms 
included in the survey represent the majority of firms in the gold mining industry during this 
period. Firms that are not included tend to be small or privately held corporations.  
                                                 
7 Based on the survey data collected by Bodnar, Hayt and Marston  (1998), Géczy, Minton and Schrand (2007) find 
that the sensitivity of CFO compensation to stock returns (delta) is positively associated with the probability of 
actively taking positions, while the sensitivity of CEO compensation to stock returns is negatively related to 
speculation. Beber and Fabbri (2006) also examine the link between CEO compensation and selective hedging for a 
sample of large U.S. non-financial firms with foreign currency exposure. They document a weakly positive relation 
between CEO delta or vega and selective hedging, although they also show that managers whose compensation is 
tied to stock return volatility will hedge less. 
8 To our knowledge, this is still the best available data set to systematically study corporate speculation with 
derivatives. Tufano (1996) studies 48 gold mining firms using quarterly data between 1991 and 1993 from the Ted 
Reeve survey while Brown, Crabb and Haushalter (2006) study 44 gold mining firms using quarterly data between 
1993 and 1998 from the same survey. 
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The Scotia McLeod survey contains detailed quarterly information on all outstanding 
gold derivatives positions, i.e., the type of instrument, the size and direction of the position, 
average delivery prices and maturities for each instrument type, and the future expected gold 
production. There are a total of 2,541 firm-quarter observations of which 1,450 firm-quarters 
represent non-zero hedging portfolios. Tufano (1996) and Adam and Fernando (2006) provide 
further details about this data set. 
Following Tufano (1996), we measure the extent of derivatives usage by a hedge ratio for 
each firm i and time t ( pith ) that is defined as follows: 
 
   1 3     
  1 3  
Portfolio delta ( - year contracts )
Total hedge ratio ( production )
Expected production ( - year ahead )
  (1) 
 
The portfolio delta is the amount of gold that the firm has effectively sold short, 
computed as the sum of the deltas of all of a firm’s gold derivatives positions (in ounces of 
gold).9 Expected production is a firm’s expected gold production over the next three years. Thus, 
this hedge ratio represents the fraction of gold production over the next three years that has been 
hedged. 
Since some variation in the hedge ratio may be caused by firms revising their 
expectations about their future gold production, we also calculate an alternate hedge ratio that 
reflects the fraction of a firm’s total gold reserves that has been hedged, as in Jin and Jorion 
(2006). This ratio ( rith ) is defined as follows: 
                                                 
9 The survey reports derivatives contracts with maturities of up to five years. However, since only a few firms use 
four and five year hedges – the average contract maturity is 1.5 years – we focus our attention on derivatives 
contracts that mature within three years. Including four and five year maturities does not change any of our 
conclusions. The results are available from the authors upon request.  
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   1 3     
  
Portfolio delta ( - year contracts )
Total hedge ratio ( reserves )
Total gold reserves
  (2) 
Gold reserves in ounces of gold are collected manually from firms’ financial statements. 
Following Haushalter (2000) and Adam and Fernando (2006), our methodology for 
measuring selective hedging explicitly accounts for the fact that hedging involves two sequential 
decisions: (a) to hedge or not to hedge; and (b) conditional on the decision to hedge, how much 
to hedge. We use a Heckman (1979) two-step model to reflect this two-stage decision process 
and control for any selection bias associated with estimating the speculation of firms that hedge. 
In the first stage, we estimate a probit regression to model the likelihood that a firm hedges. We 
calculate an Inverse Mills ratio from the first stage results, which we include in the second stage 
regression that models the extent to which firms hedge their gold production.10 As in Adam and 
Fernando (2006), this procedure gives us predicted hedge ratios ( ithˆ ) for each firm i and time t. 
Next, we measure the extent of selective hedging by the yearly standard deviation of the 
quarterly residuals (eit) from the second step regression of the Heckman two-step model: 
 
   4 4 22
1 1
1 1  
4 4
p p p
i it it it
t t
ˆTotal speculation ( production ) e h h
 
     (3) 
 
   4 4 22
1 1
1 1  
4 4
r r r
i it it it
t t
ˆTotal speculation ( reserves ) e h h
 
     (4) 
 
Adam and Fernando (2006) measure the extent of speculation by the deviation of the 
actual hedge ratio from a predicted hedge ratio, i.e., a hedge ratio derived from a pure hedging 
                                                 
10 The Heckman (1979) two-step methodology requires at least one explanatory variable in the first stage that is not 
included in the second stage. In the first stage, we include firm size, market-to-book ratio, dividend policy, quick 
ratio, and leverage. In the second stage, we include all those variables except for leverage. We also investigated the 
effect of omitting other first-stage variables in the second stage but the results were substantively similar. We also 
include quarterly dummy variables in the second stage to account for seasonality in hedging. These variables are 
estimated following Adam and Fernando (2006).  
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paradigm, using five different methods, including the two methods we use here. They find that 
the five methods yield broadly similar results. 
Brown, Crabb and Haushalter (2006) use the standard deviation of quarterly hedge ratios 
to measure the extent of speculation. We also follow their methodology and calculate two further 
measure of speculation, which are defined as follows: 
 
 4 2
1
1  ( )
4
p p p
i it i
t
Total speculation robustness h h

   (5) 
 
 4 2
1
1  ( )
4
r r r
i it i
t
Total speculation robustness h h

   (6) 
 
We obtain financial data from Compustat or from a manual search of firms’ financial 
statements if a firm is not covered by Compustat. Stock prices are obtained from CRSP. This 
data is used to calculate measures of firm size, market-to-book ratio of assets, leverage, liquidity, 
dividend policy, Altman’s (1968) Z-score, and Ohlson’s (1980) O-score. All variable definitions 
are provided in Appendix I. Table 1 provides summary statistics of our sample.  
[Place Table 1 about here] 
Altman (1968) shows that firms with Z-scores less than 1.81 are associated with a “high” 
probability of distress, whereas firms with Z-scores above 2.99 are in the “safe zone.” The 
descriptive statistics in Panel A of Table 1 show that while the mean and median Z-scores in our 
sample are 2.54 and 2.46, respectively, the 10th and 90th percentiles are 0 and 5.11 Thus, despite 
the industry focus, the firms in our sample exhibit a wide range of probabilities of bankruptcy 
with approximately a third having Z-scores below 1.81. Our O-score summary statistics are quite 
                                                 
11 We winsorize the Z-scores at zero on the left and five on the right to prevent our results from being influenced by 
extreme values. 
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similar to those reported by Dichev (1998), who uses the universe of post-1980 industrial firms 
in his study. For example, the mean and standard deviation of O-scores in our sample are -1.41 
and 3.69 respectively, compared to -1.44 and 3.19 in Dichev (1998).12 Leverage averages 42% in 
our sample, and 43% of our firm-year observations are for dividend payers. We observe 
considerable variation in firm characteristics across our sample firms.  
The descriptive statistics in Panel B of Table 1 show that 74% of our sample firms are 
hedgers. Among hedgers, an average of 44% of their expected gold production is short sold in 
advance over a three-year horizon. For this same sample of hedgers, average hedge ratios decline 
from 49% for one-year maturities to 21% for three-year maturities, indicating that most of the 
derivatives activity takes place in shorter maturity contracts. 
We also collect data on several corporate governance measures that have been used in the 
literature. We collect data from proxy statements about the size of the board of directors,13 the 
percentage of outsiders on the board of directors,14 board classification (a dummy variable equal 
to one if the board is staggered and zero otherwise),15 the tenure of CEOs,16 and institutional 
ownership in the firm.17 Outside directors are directors who are neither executives nor 
individuals who are likely to have a business relationship with the firm, such as lawyers or 
bankers. We also identify CEOs that also hold the position of chairman of the board.18 We hand 
collect the age of firms since incorporation from various issues of the Mergent’s industrial 
                                                 
12 As with the Z-scores, we truncate O-scores at the 1% level to avoid the possibility of extreme observations driving 
our results.  
13 See, for example, Jensen (1993), Yermack (1996), Coles, Daniel and Naveen (2008), and Linck, Netter and Yang 
(2008). 
14 See, for example, Weisbach (1988), Brickley, Coles, and Terry (1994), and Coles, Daniel and Naveen (2006). 
15 See, for example, Faleye (2007), and Ahn, Goyal, and Shrestha (2008). 
16 See, for example, Hermalin and Weisbach (1988), and Ryan and Wiggins (2004). 
17 See, for example, Shleifer and Vishny (1986), Carleton, Nelson and Weisbach (1998), Gillan and Starks (2000), 
and Hartzell and Starks (2003). 
18 See, for example, Fama and Jensen (1983), Jensen (1993), and Brickley, Coles, and Jarrell (1997). 
 14
manual, bank & finance manual, and OTC manual, all published by Moody’s Investors Service. 
If the data are unavailable from these sources, we examine company histories using Hoovers. 
The descriptive statistics in Panel C of Table 1 show that board sizes mostly vary 
between 6 and 13 board members, with a median of 8 directors. Of these, 71% are outside 
directors.  About 29% of the boards in the sample are staggered, and about half of the CEOs also 
hold the title of chairman of the board. Institutions own on average 21% of the equity of our 
sample firms.  
Finally, we gather compensation data from ExecuComp or through manual collection 
from proxy statements if the firm is not covered by ExecuComp. We also obtain the stock and 
option holdings for CEOs and CFOs. We then estimate the sensitivities of stock and option 
holdings to changes in stock price level (delta) and volatility (vega) following the methodology 
of Core and Guay (2002). We use the end of year stock price from Compustat as the underlying 
stock price in the Black-Scholes options pricing formula. We obtain any cash dividends paid by 
the firm from Compustat. The risk-free interest rate is the yield on the Treasury bond whose 
maturity is closest to the maturity of the stock option. We compute stock return volatility from 
weekly adjusted stock returns obtained from CRSP and Datastream. We calculate the delta of 
each executive’s compensation as the sum of the deltas of all outstanding options plus the delta 
of the executive’s shareholdings. We calculate the vega of the executive’s compensation as the 
sum of the vegas of all option holdings of the executive. Following Coles, Daniel and Naveen 
(2006), we assume the vega of shareholdings to be zero. Appendix I provides further details on 
the calculation of delta and vega. We use lagged compensation data in all our regressions. 
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 A. Estimation of Speculation Measures 
To compute our measures of speculation, we must first model the magnitude of hedging 
by firms. Since the decision to use derivatives is not random, it is possible that our hedging 
sample may be subject to sample selection bias. To control for this potential selection bias, we 
estimate Heckman (1979) two-step selection models. The first step models the decision to use 
derivatives using a standard probit model. We use several explanatory variables that have been 
identified in the prior literature as determinants of hedging. These variables include firm size, the 
market-to-book ratio of assets, dividend policy, liquidity and leverage.19 The second step models 
the magnitude of hedging via OLS, using the Inverse Mills Ratio as an additional regressor to 
correct for any sample selection bias.20 We also add quarterly dummy variables to control for any 
predictable intra-year time series variation in hedge ratios. The sample in the second step is 
limited to derivatives users only. 
Results of the Heckman (1979) two-step regressions are presented in Table 2. Consistent 
with prior studies we observe a strong positive relation between the likelihood of using 
derivatives and firm size (statistically significant at the 1% level for all model specifications).21 
Furthermore, we find negative relations between the market-to-book ratio and the decision to use 
derivatives, which is consistent with the evidence in Mian (1996). The market-to-book ratio is 
widely used as a proxy for growth opportunities. In the mining industry it is likely to proxy for 
the magnitude of a firm’s gold price exposure. Firms with fewer growth opportunities have more 
developed mines in operation and thus larger gold price exposures stemming from future gold 
sales than firms with more growth opportunities. We also find that the decision to use derivatives 
                                                 
19 See, for example, Tufano (1996), Mian (1996) and Haushalter (2000). 
20 We use robust standard errors in the second step of the two-step procedure following Heckman (1979). 
21 See, for example, Tufano (1996), Mian (1996), Bodnar, Hayt and Marston (1998), Haushalter (2000) and Adam 
and Fernando (2006).  
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is negatively correlated with both corporate liquidity and whether or not a firm pays dividends. 
Holding liquidity can be seen as a substitute for hedging, which would explain the negative 
correlation between the decision to use derivatives and the quick ratio. Overall, these results are 
consistent with Tufano (1996) and Adam (2002). 
[Place Table 2 about here] 
Next, we use the residuals from the second stage regression to calculate the total 
speculation measures according to equations (3) and (4). Panel B of Table 1 shows descriptive 
statistics of the two speculation measures.  
 
IV. Characteristics of Firms that Hedge Selectively 
In this section, we examine how selective hedging is related to firm size, the probability 
of bankruptcy, and a number of corporate governance variables. After obtaining our primary 
speculation measures from the Heckman two-step regressions described in the previous section, 
we estimate our regressions using OLS, controlling for firm-level clustering in all our tests to 
avoid biased standard errors (Petersen, 2009). We conclude with robustness checks using 
alternate speculation measures and alternate measures of a firm’s potential information 
advantage. 
 
A. Speculation, Firm Size and the Probability of Bankruptcy 
  Table 3 presents the results on how speculation is related to firm characteristics, 
including its corporate governance characteristics. In this subsection, we focus specifically on 
how firm size, as a proxy for inside information about the gold market, and Altman’s Z-score 
and Ohlson’s (1980) O-score, as measures of the probability of bankruptcy, are related to the 
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extent of speculation. The results in Table 3 show that smaller firms speculate more than larger 
firms. For example, an increase in firm size by one standard deviation from the mean is 
associated with a decrease in total speculation (reserves) by around 0.0191. We obtain 
substantively similar results for our other speculation measures. Given that the mean value of 
total speculation (reserves) is only 0.03, this represents a reduction of 64%. This finding is 
especially remarkable in light of the fact that it is typically the larger firms that are more likely to 
hedge and hedge more of their gold production than smaller firms.  
[Place Table 3 about here] 
As noted in Section II, the theoretical relation between selective hedging and the 
likelihood of financial distress is ambiguous. Stulz (1996) highlights the need for firms that 
engage in selective hedging to have the financial strength to bear the additional risk of acting on 
their market views. On the other hand, Stulz (1996) and Campbell and Kracaw (1999) provide 
different reasons as to why financially distressed firms could have more incentives to speculate 
than financially secure firms. To test for this potential convexity, we allow for the relationship 
between speculation and Z-scores/O-scores to be non-linear by including the square of Z-
scores/O-scores.  
Our tests support the argument that speculation is positively related to the likelihood of 
financial distress. The relationship between speculation and Z-score is negative and statistically 
significant at the 5% level or better in all our specifications. Since the Z-score decreases with the 
probability of bankruptcy, this finding confirms that firms with a higher probability of 
bankruptcy speculate more. We obtain consistent results using O-scores although the coefficients 
are statistically significant (at the 5% level) only for one of our two speculation measures. O-
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scores increase with the probability of bankruptcy and we observe a positive significant 
coefficient between total speculation (production) and O-scores.  
We also observe some evidence of convexity in the relationship when we use Z-scores to 
proxy for bankruptcy risk. The coefficient on the Z2 term is positive and statistically significant 
at the 5% level or better in all our specifications. In contrast, the coefficient on O2 does not have 
a consistent sign and has lower levels of statistical significance. Furthermore, the economic 
magnitude of the coefficient on the Z2 term is small. This implies that we are estimating mostly 
the downward-sloping part of a quadratic relation rather than a symmetric U-shaped relation. For 
example, total speculation measured using either production or reserves is minimized at Z scores 
that are slightly above 3.5. In both cases, approximately 70% of the corresponding sample firms 
have Z scores below this value. Taking account of the convexity, a decrease in the Z-score from 
2 to 1 is associated with an increase in total speculation (reserves) by 0.021, which represents an 
increase of 70% relative to the mean value of total speculation. In contrast, an increase in the Z-
score from 4 to 5 is associated with an increase in total speculation (reserves) of 0.0037, an 
increase of only 12% relative to the mean. Therefore, while decreases in the Z-score for low 
values of Z lead to economically significant increases in speculation, the increases in speculation 
associated with Z-score increases for high values of Z are considerably more modest. A similarly 
stark asymmetry between the two sides of the U-shape is observed when we use total speculation 
(production), which confirms that we are, indeed, estimating mostly the downward-sloping part 
of the quadratic relation. As a consequence of this convex relation, for firms facing higher 
probabilities of financial distress (roughly the bottom two-thirds of our sample ranked by Z-
score) we find support for the arguments in Stulz (1996) and Campbell and Kracaw (1999) that 
financially distressed firms will speculate more than financially secure firms.  
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If financially distressed firms speculate more than financially secure firms, we would also 
expect to find that speculation causes higher stock return volatility, which would be consistent 
with the motive that drives these firms to speculate in the first place. We test for this possibility 
by examining how lagged changes in speculation are related to changes in stock return volatility 
after controlling for a variety of other determinants of stock return volatility. The results are 
reported in Table 4. The coefficient on the lagged speculation change is positive and statistically 
significant at the 5% level or better for total speculation (production), at the 1% level for 2-year 
speculation and at the 10% level for one of our total speculation (reserves) specifications. While 
the other coefficients are not statistically significant, these results provide considerable support 
for the notion that corporate speculation may be motivated at least in part by wealth transfer 
reasons or to overcome financial constraints.22 
[Place Table 4 about here] 
  
B. Discussion 
We find that larger firms are more likely to hedge than smaller firms, and hedge more of 
their production than smaller firms. These findings are consistent with prior studies, and may 
indicate that larger firms are more sophisticated and can commit greater financial resources and 
expertise to a risk management program than smaller firms. In contrast, we find that smaller 
firms speculate more than larger firms. This finding is puzzling because larger firms should be 
more likely to have an information advantage about the gold market than smaller firms and 
therefore, if firms speculate based on superior information, we would expect to see a higher 
propensity to engage in selective hedging among larger firms. It is possible that smaller firms are 
                                                 
22 We also have examined the relation between Tobin’s Q and selective hedging, and find that it is either 
insignificant or negative depending on model specification. The results are not reported but are available on request. 
 20
more likely to erroneously believe that they have information the market does not have, when in 
fact they do not, which is consistent with the view stemming from Graham and Harvey (2001) 
that smaller firms are financially less sophisticated than larger firms. 
Our findings are also consistent with the argument in Campbell and Kracaw (1999). 
Smaller firms are more constrained in raising external capital due to asymmetric information, 
and may engage in selective hedging in the hope of supplementing their smaller internal 
resources. Additionally, our finding that among financially weaker firms, those that have a 
higher probability of bankruptcy speculate more lends support to the Stulz (1996) agency-
theoretic notion that shareholders of firms close to bankruptcy may have incentives to speculate 
at the cost of bondholders.  
 
C. Selective Hedging and Corporate Governance Characteristics 
The findings in Adam and Fernando (2006) and Brown, Crabb, and Haushalter (2006), 
that selective hedging is not value increasing for shareholders, also raise the question of how 
selective hedging is related to corporate governance. Is there a systematic association between 
specific governance characteristics and an activity that seemingly creates no value for 
shareholders? Unfortunately, the availability of corporate governance data for our sample of 
firms is considerably limited and restricts the extent of analysis we can carry out to address this 
issue.  
Table 3 also presents the results of our analysis of how selective hedging is related to (a) 
several board characteristics, (b) CEO tenure, and (c) institutional ownership. While some of our 
results are relatively weak and while the normative assessment of our results are subject to the 
caution advanced by Coles, Lemmon and Wang (2009) about the pitfalls of interpreting 
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performance on structure models, we highlight a few noteworthy relationships between selective 
hedging and corporate governance measures. The coefficient for board size is positive and 
statistically significant at the 5% level or better for both measures of total speculation. These 
results suggest that firms with larger boards speculate more than firms with smaller boards. We 
also find that the coefficient for the staggered board dummy is negative and significant at the 5% 
level for total speculation in model I. This finding suggests that firms with staggered boards 
speculate less. Board independence and CEO duality do not seem to affect speculation in our 
study. The coefficient for CEO tenure, while negative in all four specifications, is only 
statistically significant in models III and IV.  
We repeat our tests by including firm-level fixed effects to allow for the possibility that 
our previous results may be driven by omitted variables. We do so by including firm-level fixed 
effects in the second step of the Heckman two-step procedure before we estimate the residuals 
with which we calculate our measure of speculation. We then obtain these new residuals and re-
estimate speculation as before. We present the results of our analysis with this alternative 
measure of speculation in models V-VIII of Table 3. All our results are virtually unchanged 
when we add fixed effects to the second step of the Heckman two-step regression.  
 
D. Discussion 
 Overall, our results show that speculation is weakly related to a number of corporate 
governance measures. Among the strongest of these relationships is the finding that firms with 
larger boards speculate more than firms with smaller boards. In the absence of any evidence of a 
positive relation between speculation and shareholder value, these results also complement our 
earlier findings about the positive association between the likelihood of financial distress and 
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corporate speculation, and suggest that the value-maximizing drivers of selective hedging 
postulated by Stulz (1996) are not at work in our sample of firms. 
 
E. Robustness 
 In this subsection, we perform additional empirical tests to further examine the 
robustness of the previously presented findings to the use of (a) alternate speculation measures 
and (b) alternate measures of a firm’s potential information advantage.  
We first carry out robustness checks using our alternate measure of speculation. 
Following Brown, Crabb and Haushalter (2006), we use the standard deviation of quarterly 
hedge ratios to measure the extent of speculation. As before, we carry out the analysis using the 
Heckman (1979) two-step procedure except that unlike before, we directly model speculation in 
the second stage.23 We present the second step results in Table 5. The results are consistent with 
the results reported in Table 3. Speculation continues to be negatively related to Firm size and Z 
score in most models. Speculation is weakly positively related to O-scores for total speculation 
(production). In addition, Z2 is positive and statistically significant in all specifications except for 
1- and 2-year speculation. As in Table 3, board size is positively related to speculation for total 
speculation in models II-IV (statistically significant at the 1% level). As before, board 
independence and CEO-chair duality are not significant here. Our results are consistent with our 
finding in Table 3 that firms with larger boards speculate more than firms with smaller boards. 
The staggered board dummy is negative in model I. While institutional ownership was not 
significantly related to speculation in Table 3, with our alternate measure of speculation 
                                                 
23 Because we calculate the standard deviation of hedge ratios before running the second step in the Heckman two-
step procedure, we are left with significantly fewer observations for the second-step regression, which makes it 
impossible to include firm fixed effects in this specification.  
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institutional ownership is negatively related to speculation at the 5% level, providing weak 
evidence to suggest that institutions help monitor executives to reduce speculation.  
[Place Table 5 about here] 
We have argued that firm size is a reasonable proxy for a firm’s information advantage 
because larger firms have better access to information through their more extensive market 
presence, and because they would also typically have more expertise and other resources to 
acquire any information they may need. In this section, we also explore whether our previous 
findings are robust to the use of two alternate measures of a firm’s potential information 
advantage.24 Since the information advantage in our case pertains to the future price of gold, we 
use a firm’s annual gold production and gold reserves as two alternate measures of information 
advantage. Because some of the firms in our sample are also engaged in the mining of other 
metals and commodities, gold production and reserves have the potential to provide more precise 
measures of a firm’s footprint in the gold market, albeit at the cost of diluting other drivers of 
information advantage such as management quality and other sources of in-house expertise, and 
access to external information resources.  
The results presented in Table 6, although weaker than the results using firm size (in part 
due to smaller sample sizes), are consistent with our previous conclusions using firm size as a 
proxy for information advantage. In Panel A, production and reserves are negatively related to 
the level of speculation for total speculation (reserves) at the 10% and 1% levels, respectively. 
The previous findings for Z-score and O-score continue to hold robustly for most of the 
specifications. Board size continues to be positively and significantly related to speculation in 
models I-IV.  
                                                 
24 In unreported work we also examine firm age and CEO tenure as potential measures of information advantage and 
obtain broadly similar results.  
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[Place Table 6 about here]  
 
V. Selective Hedging and Managerial Compensation 
In this section, we examine the possibility that selective hedging may be a rational 
managerial response to incentive compensation. As noted in Section II, if selective hedging 
increases the volatility of a firm’s stock, managers who hold a significant number of stock 
options may be more inclined to speculate than managers with few or no stock options because 
the value of options increases with volatility. If so, we would expect to find a positive relation 
between speculation and the sensitivity of executives’ compensation packages to their firm’s 
stock price volatility. On the other hand, Adam and Fernando (2006) and Brown, Crabb and 
Haushalter (2006) show that firms do not earn economically significant cash flows on average 
from selective hedging, which implies that corporate speculation does not create shareholder 
value. If this is common knowledge among a firm’s managers, we would expect corporate 
speculation to decrease with the sensitivity of managerial stock and option holdings to the firm’s 
stock price. 
Managerial ownership of the firm can be obtained through holding stock as well as stock 
options, which we measure by the sum of the deltas of stock and option holdings of the CEO or 
the CFO. We measure the sensitivity of stock option holdings to changes in the stock price 
volatility by calculating the aggregate vega of the option holdings of the CEO or CFO. 
The results for CEO and CFO compensation are presented in Table 7. None of the four 
compensation coefficients (CEO delta, CEO vega, CFO delta and CFO vega) are statistically 
significant in any of our specifications.   
[Place Table 7 about here] 
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A. Discussion 
Our finding that speculation is unrelated to the vega of option holdings by either CEOs 
and CFOs provides no support for the view that stock option ownership could motivate managers 
to speculate in order to increase stock return volatility and thus increase the value of their stock 
options. Our finding that speculation does not increase with vega is especially significant in light 
of the result reported in Table 4 that speculation increases stock price volatility, and runs counter 
to the findings in recent studies by Burns and Kedia (2006) and Denis, Hanouna and Sarin 
(2006) that stock option compensation is positively related to the likelihood that managers will 
engage in strategies that potentially hurt shareholders. Burns and Kedia (2006) find that the 
sensitivity of the CEO's option portfolio to stock price is significantly positively related to the 
propensity to misreport earnings, while Denis, Hanouna and Sarin (2006) find that stock options 
increase the incentive for managers to engage in fraudulent activity. It is possible that their 
awareness that selective hedging does not create value, coupled with their own stakes in the firm, 
deter executives who own options and stock from engaging in speculation. 
 
VI. Conclusions 
There is considerable evidence that firms use derivatives not only to hedge but also to 
speculate. We examine whether this practice of selective hedging is consistent with the two 
economic criteria stipulated by Stulz (1996) for this activity to create value: (a) possession of 
private information by firms; and (b) possession of sufficient financial strength to take the 
additional risk that selective hedging imposes. We also examine the alternative possibility that 
firms engage in selective hedging activities due to asset substitution motives.  
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We find a negative relation between selective hedging and firm size, implying that 
smaller firms speculate more than larger firms. Since small firms generally have less private 
information than large firms due to their smaller footprint and paucity of resources to generate 
information, this finding is the opposite of what a theory of rational selective hedging based on 
an information advantage would predict. Our finding of a positive relation between the extent of 
selective hedging and the probability of financial distress lends support to the alternative 
explanation that selective hedging is largely driven by wealth transfer motives. 
We also find weak relationships between speculation and some measures of corporate 
governance, of which the most robust is our finding that firms with larger boards speculate more 
than firms with smaller boards. We find no evidence to suggest that speculation is driven by 
managerial compensation, which is especially significant in light of our finding that stock price 
volatility is positively related to speculation. 
Taken together, our findings suggest that the speculation undertaken by firms in our study 
may be driven by wealth transfer or financial constraints motives. Nonetheless, our study does 
not rule out the remaining possibility for selective hedging highlighted by Stulz (1996) -- that 
managers hedge selectively because they erroneously believe that they can outperform the 
market. While pointing to specific types of firms that are more likely to engage in selective 
hedging and specific motives that may drive selective hedging, our study renews the challenge of 
rationalizing a practice that provides no documented benefit to shareholders or managers. Our 
findings also have potential normative implications from the standpoint of both corporate 
governance and the regulatory oversight of public corporations. 
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Appendix I: Definition of Variables 
 
This Appendix lists all the variables used in the paper, provides their definitions and explains 
how they are constructed. In addition to the 1989 to 1999 gold derivatives data set from the Gold 
and Silver Hedge Outlook  by Ted Reeve/Scotia McLeod, the principal data sources are 
Compustat, CRSP, ExecuComp, firms’ annual reports and 10-K forms. Market data is obtained 
from Datastream. 
Altman’s  (1968) Z-score: Defined as: 
1 2 3 4 51 20 1 40 3 30 0 60 0 999Z . * X . * X . * X . * X . * X      
where X1 = working capital (current assets – current liabilities)/total assets; X2 = retained 
earnings/total assets; X3 = earnings before interest and taxes/total assets; X4 = market value of 
equity/ book value of total debt; and X5 = sales/total assets. 
Board size: The number of individuals on the board of directors. 
CEO/CFO compensation delta an d vega: CEO/CFO (aggregate) compensation delta is the 
change in the dollar value of the executive’s wealth derived from ownership of stock and stock 
options in the firm when the firm’s stock price changes by one percent. CEO/CFO (aggregate) 
compensation vega is the change in the dollar value of the executive’s wealth derived from 
ownership of stock and stock options in the firm when the annualized standard deviation of the 
firm’s stock price changes by 0.01. We calculate the (aggregate) delta of the executive’s 
compensation as the sum of the deltas of the options holdings and the delta of the stock holdings. 
We obtain the (aggregate) vega of the executive’s compensation as the sum of the vegas of the 
executive’s options holdings. Following Coles, Daniel and Naveen (2006) we disregard the vega 
of stock holdings. The delta and vega of options holdings are calculated based on the 
methodology in Guay (1999) and Core and Guay (2002).25  
The deltas of stock and options holdings are given by: 
 
                                                 
25 Following the convention in previous studies, while all the delta and vega measures we use in our analysis are 
aggregates over the executive’s entire holdings in the firm, we omit using the qualifier “aggregate” when referring to 
compensation deltas and vegas elsewhere in the paper. 
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 Delta (stock holdings) = 0.01*S*number of shares owned (A.1) 
 Delta (options holdings) = 0 01 ( ) number of options owneddT. * e N Z S *  (A.2) 
where Z = (ln (S/X) + T (r - d + σ2/2))/(σT 0.5) 
S = underlying stock price 
X = option exercise price 
T = time to maturity of the option (number of years) 
r = ln [1 + risk-free interest rate] 
d = ln [1 + expected dividend rate on the stock] 
σ = annualized stock return volatility 
N = cumulative density function for normal distribution 
The vega of options holdings is given by: 
 0 5Vega (options holdings) = 0 01 ( ) number of options owneddT .. * e N' Z ST *  (A.3) 
where N = probability density function for normal distribution 
CEO-Chair duality: This dummy variable is equal to one if the CEO also has the title of 
chairman of the board.  
CEO tenure: The number of years the executive has served as CEO of the firm.  
Dividend dummy: Equals one if a firm paid cash dividends in the given year and is zero 
otherwise. 
Firm age: Age of the firm since incorporation. 
Firm size: The natural logarithm of the market value of assets. The market value of assets equals 
book value of assets minus book value of common stock plus market value of equity. 
Hedging dummy: Equals one if a firm is hedging (using derivatives) in a specific time period 
and is zero otherwise. Total hedging dummy equals one if a firm uses derivatives with 1-3 years 
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to maturity and equals zero otherwise. x-year hedging dummy equals one if a firm uses 
derivatives with x-year maturity and equals zero otherwise. 
Hedge ratio: The total hedge ratio is the fraction of the firm’s expected gold production (or 
reserves) over the next three years that it has hedged, calculated as the ratio of the portfolio delta 
for derivatives contracts that mature within three years to expected production (in ounces of 
gold) over the same three-year time period. Correspondingly, x-year hedge ratio is the fraction of 
the x-year expected gold production hedged. 
Institutional ownership: The percentage of the firm that is owned by institutions as reported in 
proxy statements.  
Leverage: Calculated as the book value of long-term debt divided by the sum of book values of 
preferred stock, common equity, and long-term debt. 
Market-to-book ratio of asse ts: Market value of assets divided by book value of assets. The 
market value of assets equals the book value of assets minus the book value of common stock 
plus market value of equity. 
Ohlson’s O score: Defined based on Ohlson (1980) as: O =  -1.32 - 0.407  log (total assets / 
GNP price-level index) + 6.03 (total liabilities / total assets) - 1.43 (working capital / total assets) 
+ 0.076 (current liabilities / current assets) - 1.72 (1 if total liabilities > total assets, else 0) - 2.37 
(net income / total assets) - 1.83 (funds from operations/total liabilities) + 0.285 (1 if net loss for 
last two years, else 0) - 0.521 (net incomet - net incomet-1)/(|net incomet| + |net incomet-1|). 
Outside director ratio: The percentage of outside directors in the board of directors. Outside 
directors are those directors who are not employees of the firm or of banks or law firms that 
provide services to the firm. 
Portfolio delta: Portfolio delta is the amount of gold that the firm has effectively sold short over 
a specific time period, computed as the sum of the firm’s individual derivatives positions (in 
ounces of gold) weighted by their respective deltas.  
Production: Amount of gold produced by the firm during the year (in thousands of ounces). 
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Quick ratio: Measure of corporate liquidity defined by the ratio: (cash + cash equivalents + 
receivables) / current liabilities.  
Reserves: Proven reserves of gold (in thousands of ounces) owned by the firm at the end of the 
fiscal year.  
Speculation: Speculation is the yearly standard deviation of quarterly hedge ratio residuals from 
a Heckman (1979) two-step regression. In the first step of the Heckman two-step regression, the 
dependent variable is a hedging dummy that is equal to one if the firm hedges during the year 
and zero otherwise. The dependent variable in the second stage is the proportion of expected 
production or reserves that is hedged. Total speculation (production) is based on the total hedge 
ratio (production) and total speculation (reserves) is based on the total hedge ratio (reserves). An 
alternate measure of speculation – the yearly standard deviation of the quarterly total hedge 
ratios – is used in robustness checks. 
Staggered board dummy:  A dummy variable equal to one if the firm has staggered elections 
for directors and zero otherwise. 
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Table 1 
Firm Characteristics, Derivatives Usage, Corporate Governance, and CEO/CFO Compensation 
Characteristics 
This table presents summary statistics of firm characteristics, derivatives usage, CEO/CFO compensation and 
board characteristics for 92 North American gold mining companies between 1989 and 1999. Firm size is the log 
of the market value of assets in millions of US$. Market-to-book ratio is the market value of assets divided by the 
book value of assets. Dividend dummy is a dummy variable that equals one if a firm paid cash dividends in year t 
and zero otherwise. Quick ratio equals [(cash + cash equivalents + receivables) / current liabilities]. Leverage is the 
ratio of the book value of debt to the book value of preferred stock, common stock and long-term debt. Firm age is 
the number of years since the firm’s incorporation. Z-scores and O-scores are calculated following Altman (1968) 
and Ohlson (1980), respectively. Total hedging dummy equals one if a firm uses derivatives in year t with 1-3 
years to maturity and is equal to zero otherwise. Hedge ratio and predicted hedge ratio statistics are estimated only 
for hedgers. Total hedge ratio is the fraction of the future 3-year expected gold production (or reserves) hedged 
each quarter, calculated by dividing the 3-year portfolio delta by the expected production over the next three years 
(or reserves). Total speculation is the yearly standard deviation of the quarterly residuals from a two-step Heckman 
regression of hedging on firm characteristics. Institutional ownership is the percentage of the firm owned by 
institutions as reported in proxy statements. CEO tenure is the tenure of the CEO in the firm. Board size is the 
number of members in the board of directors. Outsider director ratio is the fraction of outside members in the board 
of directors. Staggered dummy is equal to one if the board of directors is staggered and zero otherwise. CEO – 
Chair duality is a dummy variable that equals one if the CEO is also the chairman of the board and zero otherwise. 
CEO and CFO compensation deltas and vegas are calculated as in Core and Guay (2002). 
 Mean Median Std. Dev 
10th 
Percentile 
90th 
Percentile Obs. 
Panel A. Firm Characteristics             
Firm size 5.59 5.46 1.74 3.51 8.21 1993 
Market-to-book ratio of assets 1.85 1.56 1.1 0.82 3.18 1993 
Dividend dummy 0.43 0 0.5 0 1 1995 
Quick Ratio 3.73 1.63 8.82 0.26 6.7 1966 
Leverage 0.42 0.17 3.63 0 0.52 1976 
Ohlson’s O-score -1.41 -1.76 3.69 -4.42 2.45 1318 
Altman’s Z-score 2.54 2.46 1.84 0 5 1595 
Panel B. Derivatives Usage Characteristics 
Total hedging dummy 0.74 1 0.44 0 1 2274 
Total hedge ratio (quarterly) 0.44 0.34 0.39 0 0.98 615 
Total hedge ratio (reserves) (quarterly) 0.08 0.05 0.11 0 0.2 1215 
Total speculation 0.11 0.08 0.1 0.03 0.22 171 
Total speculation (reserves) 0.03 0.01 0.05 0 0.06 293 
Panel C. Corporate Governance   
Board size 8.63 8 2.81 6 13 1264 
Outsider director ratio 0.71 0.714 0.14 0.5 0.89 1264 
Staggered board dummy 0.29 0 0.45 0 1 1316 
CEO – Chair duality 0.52 1 0.5 0 1 1306 
CEO tenure 7.27 4 7.94 1 17 1450 
Institutional ownership 0.21 0.1 0.27 0 0.71 1236 
Firm age 22.32 12 26.49 5 66 1019 
Panel D. CEO/CFO Compensation Characteristics 
Delta of CEO compensation ($000s) 288.53 23.57 1204.23 3.75 305.34 1059 
Delta of CFO compensation ($000s) 74.94 13.44 172.1 0.49 180.22 545 
Vega of CEO compensation ($000s) 53.57 7.38 207.09 0.42 80.89 1135 
Vega of CFO compensation ($000s) 8.94 3.04 20.89 0.02 18 792 
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Table 2
Heckman Two-Step Analysis of Hedging
    
This table presents regression results of a Heckman (1979) two-step selection model. The first 
step (model I) models the decision to use derivatives and the second step (models II and III) 
models hedge ratios as a function of firm characteristics. The dependent variables in the first 
step are total hedging dummies that equal one if a firm uses derivatives with 1-3 years to 
maturity and equal zero otherwise. The dependent variable in the second step is either the total 
hedge ratio, which is the fraction of the future 3-year expected gold production (or reserves) 
hedged each quarter, calculated by dividing the 3-year portfolio delta by the expected 
production over the next three years (or reserves). Firm size is the log of the market value of 
assets in millions of US$. Market-to-book ratio is the market value of assets divided by the 
book value of assets. Dividend dummy is a dummy variable that equals one if a firm paid cash 
dividends in year t and zero otherwise. Quick ratio equals [(cash + cash equivalents + 
receivables) / current liabilities]. Leverage is the ratio of the book value of debt to the book 
value of preferred stock, common stock and long-term debt. Figures in parentheses denote t-
statistics and *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10, 5, and 1% levels respectively. 
  
  I II III 
  
Total Hedging 
Dummy
Total Hedge Ratio 
(production)
Total Hedge Ratio 
(reserves) 
Firm Size 0.454*** 0.0912* 0.0437*** -12.58 -1.682 -5.341 
Market to book -0.485*** -0.0649 -0.0644*** (-9.606) (-0.914) (-5.230) 
Dividend dummy -0.250** -0.146*** -0.0484*** (-2.104) (-3.614) (-4.822) 
Quick ratio -0.00958* -0.00878*** -0.00471*** (-1.882) (-3.543) (-6.957) 
Leverage -0.151   
(-0.801)   
Inverse Mills ratio  0.00797 0.262***  -0.0363 -4.408 
Intercept -1.271*** 0.0148 -0.122*** (-7.287) -0.0455 (-2.673) 
Includes quarterly dummies No Yes Yes 
Observations 1041 615 1215 
χ2 NA 282.4 239.8 
Pr > χ2 NA (<0.001) (<0.001) 
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Table 3
Selective Hedging as a Function of Firm Characteristics, Board Characteristics, CEO 
Tenure and Institutional Ownership 
This table presents the regression results of speculation as a function of firm characteristics, 
board characteristics, CEO tenure and institutional ownership. Total speculation is the yearly 
standard deviation of the quarterly residuals from a two-step Heckman regression of hedging 
on firm characteristics. Firm size is the log of the market value of assets in millions of US$. Z-
scores and O-scores are calculated following Altman (1968) and Ohlson (1980), respectively. 
Institutional ownership is the percentage of the firm owned by institutions as reported in proxy 
statements. Staggered dummy is equal to one if the board of directors is staggered and zero 
otherwise. CEO-Chair duality is equal to one if the CEO is also the chairman of the board and 
zero otherwise. CEO tenure is the tenure of chief executive officers at their firms. Outside 
director ratio is the fraction of outsiders on the board of directors and board size is the number 
of directors on the board of directors. Figures in parentheses denote t-statistics estimated with 
standard errors adjusted for firm clustering following Petersen (2009) and *, **, and *** denote 
significance at the 10, 5, and 1% levels respectively. The second stage in the Heckman two-step 
regression includes firm fixed effects for models V-VIII but not for models I-IV. 
 I II III IV 
  
Total 
Speculation 
(production) 
Total 
Speculation  
(reserves)
Total 
Speculation 
(production)
Total 
Speculation  
(reserves) 
Panel A: Without firm fixed effects in second stage of Heckman regression 
Firm size -0.0232** -0.0110*** -0.0290* -0.0159*** 
(-2.062) (-4.090) (-1.792) (-4.075) 
Z score -0.0681*** -0.0294**   
(-3.121) (-2.572)   
Z score2 0.00969*** 0.00413**   
-2.875 -2.236   
O score   0.0211** 7.55e-05   (2.112) (0.0394) 
O score2   0.00355* -0.000897*   (1.970) (-1.721) 
Board size 0.0153** 0.00627*** 0.0120* 0.00571*** 
-2.659 -3.907 (1.965) (3.188) 
Outside director 
ratio 
-0.0283 -0.0413 0.0404 -0.0341 
(-0.415) (-1.315) (0.600) (-0.826) 
Staggered dummy -0.0523** 0.00148 -0.0458* -0.00391 
(-2.137) -0.153 (-1.751) (-0.453) 
CEO – Chair duality -0.0239 -0.00594 0.00421 0.000343 (-1.148) (-0.990) (0.173) (0.0480) 
CEO tenure 0.000577 -0.000519 -0.000433 -0.000847 -0.33 (-0.965) (-0.336) (-1.539) 
Institutional 
ownership 
-0.0168 -0.00237 0.0133 -0.000810 
(-0.371) (-0.206) (0.289) (-0.0737) 
Intercept 0.251*** 0.114*** 0.185** 0.116*** -3.433 -3.824 (2.432) (2.995) 
Observations 117 206 119 202 
R-squared 0.285 0.2 0.189 0.157 
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Table 3 -- continued 
     
 V VI VII VIII 
  
Total 
Speculation 
(production) 
Total 
Speculation  
(reserves)
Total 
Speculation 
(production)
Total 
Speculation  
(reserves) 
Panel B: With firm fixed effects in second stage of Heckman regression 
Firm size -0.0224* -0.0109*** -0.0293* -0.0159*** 
(-1.976) (-3.994) (-1.776) (-4.025) 
Z score -0.0708*** -0.0296**   
(-3.148) (-2.595)   
Z score2 0.00988*** 0.00418**   
(2.834) (2.259)   
O score   0.0217** 5.70e-05   (2.094) (0.0298) 
O score2   0.00352* -0.000900*   (1.872) (-1.726) 
Board size 0.0156** 0.00628*** 0.0122* 0.00571*** 
(2.680) (3.850) (1.959) (3.146) 
Outside director 
ratio 
-0.0358 -0.0411 0.0380 -0.0341 
(-0.516) (-1.296) (0.550) (-0.822) 
Staggered dummy -0.0526** 0.000962 -0.0460* -0.00427 
(-2.070) (0.0990) (-1.700) (-0.492) 
CEO – Chair duality -0.0246 -0.00592 0.00484 0.000444 
(-1.152) (-0.982) (0.192) (0.0622) 
CEO tenure 0.000391 -0.000520 -0.000531 -0.000853 
(0.222) (-0.955) (-0.399) (-1.544) 
Institutional 
ownership 
-0.0188 -0.00279 0.0113 -0.00108 
(-0.400) (-0.241) (0.238) (-0.0977) 
Intercept 0.254*** 0.113*** 0.187** 0.115*** 
(3.414) (3.755) (2.390) (2.964) 
Observations 117 206 119 202 
R-squared 0.287 0.199 0.187 0.156 
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Table 4 
Speculation and Stock Return Volatility
This table presents the regression results of lagged changes in speculation on changes in stock 
return volatility. The dependent variable in all regressions is the annualized weekly standard 
deviation of returns for the stock price during the year t. Total speculation is the yearly standard 
deviation of the quarterly residuals from a two-step Heckman regression of hedging on firm 
characteristics. Firm size is the log of the market value of assets in millions of US$. Market-to-
book ratio is the market value of assets divided by the book value of assets. Quick ratio equals 
[(cash + cash equivalents + receivables) / current liabilities]. Leverage is the ratio of the book 
value of debt to the book value of preferred stock, common stock and long-term debt. Figures in 
parentheses denote t-statistics estimated with standard errors adjusted for firm clustering 
following Petersen (2009) and *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10, 5, and 1% levels 
respectively. 
     
  I II III IV 
  Changes in stock return volatility 
DTotal speculation (production)t-1 0.203** 0.294***
  
(2.128) (3.260)   
DTotal speculation (reserves)t-1 
  0.638 0.802* 
  (1.532) (2.014) 
Dfirm size t 
 -0.134**  -0.0599*
 (-2.240)  (-1.787) 
Dquick t 
 -0.0105**  -0.00677***
 (-2.658)  (-2.934) 
Dleverage t 
 -0.0285  0.00825 
 (-0.249)  (0.121) 
Dmarket to book t 
 0.0830**  0.0676***
 (2.267)  (3.535) 
Constant 0.0459*** 0.0429*** 0.0582*** 0.0539***(4.607) (4.073) (6.238) (5.483) 
Observations 91 86 188 178 
R-squared 0.026 0.207 0.021 0.127 
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Table 5
Robustness Checks of Selective Hedging as a Function of Firm, Board and Executive 
Characteristics using Alternative Speculation Measures 
This table presents the regression results of speculation as a function of firm characteristics, board 
characteristics, CEO tenure and institutional ownership. For this set of robustness checks, 
speculation is measured as the year by year standard deviation of quarterly hedge ratios. These 
standard deviations of hedge ratios are the dependent variable in the second step of the Heckman 
2-step regressions. The first step models the decision to hedge as a function of firm characteristics. 
Firm size is the log of the market value of assets in millions of US$. Z-scores and O-scores are 
calculated following Altman (1968) and Ohlson (1980), respectively. Institutional ownership is the 
percentage of the firm owned by institutions as reported in proxy statements. Staggered dummy is 
equal to one if the board of directors is staggered and zero otherwise. CEO-Chair duality is equal 
to one if the CEO is also the chairman of the board and zero otherwise. CEO tenure is the tenure 
of chief executive officers at their firms. Outside director ratio is the fraction of outsiders on the 
board of directors and board size is the number of directors on the board of directors. Figures in 
parentheses denote t-statistics estimated with standard errors adjusted for firm clustering following 
Petersen (2009) and *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10, 5, and 1% levels respectively.
 I II IIII IV 
  
Total 
Speculation 
(production)
Total 
Speculation  
(reserves)
Total 
Speculation 
(production)
Total 
Speculation  
(reserves)
Firm size -0.0157 -0.00749*** -0.0283*** -0.0154***
(-1.607) (-2.638) (-3.020) (-3.563)
Z score -0.0416*** -0.0323***   
(-2.905) (-2.758)   
Z score2 0.00525*** 0.00424**   
(2.636) (2.241)   
O score   0.0191* 0.000252  (1.977) (0.148)
O score2   0.00202 -0.000904*  (1.100) (-1.755)
Board size 0.0047 0.00575*** 0.00817* 0.00586***(1.269) (3.04) (1.948) (2.957)
Outside director ratio 0.0803 -0.0381 0.0194 -0.0321(1.429) (-1.160) (0.393) (-0.775)
Staggered dummy -0.0433** -0.00153 -0.0155 -0.00577(-2.302) (-0.144) (-1.030) (-0.777)
CEO – Chair duality -0.00365 -0.00326 -0.00103 0.00101(-0.209) (-0.518) (-0.0701) (0.146)
CEO tenure -0.000721 -0.000536 -0.00134* -0.000874*(-0.495) (-0.821) (-1.697) (-1.748)
Institutional ownership -0.0793** -0.00844 0.00265 -0.00289(-1.995) (-0.662) (0.112) (-0.273)
Inverse Mills ratio 0.00438 0.0311 -0.0206 0.00700(0.133) (1.219) (-0.635) (0.293)
Intercept 0.160** 0.0905*** 0.219*** 0.107***(2.272) (3.298) (3.544) (3.044)
Observations 121 206 119 202 
R-squared 0.2219 0.1986 0.294 0.151 
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Table 6
Robustness Checks Using Alternate Measures of Information Advantage 
This table presents regression results of speculation as a function of firm characteristics, board 
characteristics, CEO tenure and institutional ownership, where firm size is replaced by 
production and reserves as alternate measures of a firm’s information advantage. Total 
speculation is the yearly standard deviation of the quarterly residuals from a two-step Heckman 
regression of hedging on firm characteristics. Production is the amount of gold produced by the 
firm during the year (in thousands of ounces) and reserves are proven reserves of gold (in 
thousands of ounces) owned by the firm at the end of the fiscal year.  Z-scores and O-scores are 
calculated following Altman (1968) and Ohlson (1980), respectively. Institutional ownership is 
the percentage of the firm owned by institutions as reported in proxy statements. Staggered 
dummy is equal to one if the board of directors is staggered and zero otherwise. CEO-Chair 
duality is equal to one if the CEO is also the chairman of the board and zero otherwise. CEO 
tenure is the tenure of chief executive officers at their firms. Outside director ratio is the fraction 
of outsiders on the board of directors and board size is the number of directors on the board of 
directors. Figures in parentheses denote t-statistics estimated with standard errors adjusted for 
firm clustering following Petersen (2009) and *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10, 5, 
and 1% levels respectively.  
      
  I II III IV 
  Total Speculation (production) Total Speculation  (reserves)
Panel A: Using Altman’s Z-score as bankruptcy probability measure 
Gold production -2.56e-05**  -1.28e-05**  
(-2.218)  (-2.660)  
Gold reserves  -1.12e-06  -1.19e-06*** (-1.242)  (-3.203) 
Z score -0.0858*** -0.0869*** -0.0354*** -0.0353***(-3.247) (-3.267) (-3.045) (-3.053) 
Z score2 0.0121*** 0.0121*** 0.00503*** 0.00502***(2.991) (2.987) (2.711) (2.713) 
Board size 0.0142** 0.0123** 0.00452*** 0.00547***(2.482) (2.048) (2.897) (3.472) 
Outside director ratio -0.0359 -0.0541 -0.0427 -0.0488 (-0.547) (-0.788) (-1.103) (-1.275) 
Staggered dummy -0.0472* -0.0439 0.000577 0.000934 (-1.728) (-1.606) (0.0560) (0.0950) 
CEO – Chair duality -0.0257 -0.0293 -0.00574 -0.00404 (-1.111) (-1.305) (-0.743) (-0.525) 
CEO tenure -0.000197 -3.76e-05 -0.000808 -0.000903 (-0.0977) (-0.0186) (-1.244) (-1.413) 
Institutional ownership -0.0253 -0.0187 -0.00782 -0.00565 (-0.597) (-0.450) (-0.598) (-0.450) 
Intercept 0.162** 0.187*** 0.0811** 0.0782** (2.530) (2.722) (2.331) (2.326) 
Observations 116 116 206 206 
R-squared 0.268 0.259 0.161 0.176 
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Table 6 -- Continued 
 
 I II III IV 
  Total Speculation (production) Total Speculation  (reserves)
Panel B: Using Ohlson’s O-score as bankruptcy probability measure 
Gold production -1.84e-05  -1.15e-05*  
(-1.119)  (-1.759)  
Gold reserves  -5.40e-07  -1.14e-06** (-0.390)  (-2.302) 
O score 0.0253** 0.0254** 0.00157 0.00165 
(2.307) (2.326) (0.861) (0.909) 
O score2 0.00362 0.00327 -0.000482 -0.000492 
(1.500) (1.378) (-1.048) (-1.050) 
Board size 0.00669 0.00488 0.00163 0.00271* 
(1.201) (0.796) (1.070) (1.681) 
Outside director ratio 0.0245 0.00436 -0.0199 -0.0267 
(0.328) (0.0592) (-0.454) (-0.633) 
Staggered dummy -0.0408 -0.0383 -0.00575 -0.00589 
(-1.408) (-1.299) (-0.626) (-0.659) 
CEO – Chair duality 0.00565 0.00288 0.00396 0.00586 
(0.211) (0.107) (0.471) (0.682) 
CEO tenure -0.00107 -0.000952 -0.000940 -0.00104 
(-0.697) (-0.607) (-1.506) (-1.636) 
Institutional ownership -0.000500 0.00177 -0.00943 -0.00786 (-0.0137) (0.0477) (-0.704) (-0.609) 
Intercept 0.0822 0.108 0.0504 0.0479 (1.137) (1.446) (1.272) (1.274) 
Observations 112 112 190 190 
R-squared 0.120 0.110 0.046 0.063 
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Table 7
Selective Hedging and CEO Compensation Characteristics
This table presents the regression results of speculation as a function of CEO compensation 
characteristics. Total speculation is the yearly standard deviation of the quarterly residuals from 
a two-step Heckman regression of hedging on firm characteristics. Firm size is the log of the 
market value of assets in millions of US$. CEO compensation deltas and vegas are calculated as 
in Core and Guay (2002). Figures in parentheses denote t-statistics estimated with standard 
errors adjusted for firm clustering following Petersen (2009) and *, **, and *** denote 
significance at the 10, 5, and 1% levels respectively. 
 I II III IV 
  Total Speculation (production) Total Speculation  (reserves)
Panel A: Using Altman’s Z-score as bankruptcy probability measure 
Firm size -0.0301** 0.0135 -0.00561** -0.00324 
(-2.088) (1.661) (-2.440) (-0.869) 
Z score -0.0725*** -0.0503** -0.0308*** -0.0256 
(-3.396) (-2.180) (-2.779) (-1.151) 
Z score2 0.0105*** 0.00653* 0.00452** 0.00394 
(2.989) (1.934) (2.465) (1.059) 
Board size 0.0113* -0.00535 0.00268** 0.00216 
(1.931) (-1.601) (2.234) (1.228) 
Outside director ratio 0.0852 -0.00431 0.0181 0.0220 
(0.787) (-0.0640) (0.830) (0.604) 
Staggered dummy -0.0492** 0.0154 0.000508 0.00825 
(-2.045) (0.690) (0.0442) (0.583) 
CEO – Chair duality -0.0225 -0.00720 -0.00334 0.00434 
(-0.801) (-0.283) (-0.550) (0.533) 
CEO tenure -0.00132 -0.000200 -0.000491 7.66e-05 
(-0.830) (-0.148) (-0.942) (0.155) 
Institutional ownership -0.00784 -0.0237 -0.00885 -0.00678 
(-0.187) (-1.063) (-0.738) (-0.600) 
Log (delta of CEO 
compensation) 
0.0219  0.00181  
(1.675)  (0.797)  
Log (vega of CEO 
compensation) 
-0.0104  -0.000916  
(-0.856)  (-0.490)  
Log (delta of CFO 
compensation) 
 0.0286  -0.00368 
 (1.393)  (-0.859) 
Log (vega of CFO 
compensation) 
 -0.0305  0.000778 
 (-1.492)  (0.224) 
Intercept 0.134 0.0984 0.0572*** 0.0605** (1.559) (1.330) (3.082) (2.165) 
Observations 91 46 153 80 
R-squared 0.313 0.362 0.209 0.147 
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Table 7 -- Continued 
 
 V VI VII VIII 
  Total Speculation (production) Total Speculation  (reserves)
Panel B: Using Ohlson’s O-score as bankruptcy probability measure 
Firm size -0.0341 0.0128 -0.00968** -0.00669
(-1.622) (1.016) (-2.206) (-1.083) 
O score 0.0184 0.0385*** 0.00125 0.00131 
(1.511) (8.455) (0.619) (0.712) 
O score2 0.00438 -0.00649*** -9.54e-05 0.000206
(1.625) (-4.880) (-0.205) (0.583) 
Board size 0.00882 -0.00400 0.00260 0.00113 
(1.195) (-1.300) (1.445) (0.641) 
Outside director ratio 0.107 -0.0221 0.0305 0.0693 
(0.834) (-0.309) (0.818) (1.146) 
Staggered dummy -0.0448 0.0284 -0.00260 0.00341 
(-1.545) (1.272) (-0.265) (0.337) 
CEO – Chair duality 0.00592 -0.00246 0.00251 0.00667 
(0.176) (-0.198) (0.341) (0.945) 
CEO tenure -0.000263 0.000327 -0.000128 0.000487
(-0.174) (0.267) (-0.218) (0.608) 
Institutional ownership 0.00695 -0.0381 -0.00504 -0.0106 
(0.172) (-1.532) (-0.487) (-0.916) 
Log (delta of CEO 
compensation) 
0.0121  -0.000745  
(0.982)  (-0.336)  
Log (vega of CEO 
compensation) 
-0.00475  0.00101  
(-0.377)  (0.716)  
Log (delta of CFO 
compensation) 
 0.0250  -0.00226
 (1.288)  (-0.688) 
Log (vega of CFO 
compensation) 
 -0.0312  0.000388
 (-1.403)  (0.134) 
Intercept 0.108 0.102 0.0456 0.0172 (1.077) (1.188) (1.371) (0.636) 
Observations 94 50 153 81 
R-squared 0.169 0.462 0.079 0.093 
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